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BRIEF OF PETITIONER/APPELi..-NT
ROBERT LEE JONES

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
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the undue influence ~u. Linda Cameron?
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procured
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5.

Even if the document dated 1 May 1985 is the

valid will of the decedent, is Robert Lee Jones entitled to
inherit as a pretermitted child under Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-302
(Repl. Vol. 1978)?
6.

Does the language contained in the 1 May 1985

document drafted by Linda Cameron demonstrate the intent of the
decedent to disinherit his son, Robert Lee Jones?
7.

Did the trial court err in admitting extrinsic

evidence for the purpose of overcoming the presumption against
disinheritance created by Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-302(1)(a)?
8.

Did Herbert Lee Jones devise substantially all of

his estate to or for the exclusive benefit of the mother of
Petitioner Robert Jones or did he provide for his son by other
transfer?
9.

Did the lower court err in finding that the

purported will was signed as a will and that it was not altered
after May 1, 1985?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the Formal Probate of Will and

Appointment of Personal Representative entered on April 15,
1986, by the Third Judicial District Court for the District of
Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding.

The Formal

Probate of Will has the effect of excluding Petitioner/Appellant
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Robert Lee Jones from any inheritance from the Estate of his
father, Herbert Lee Jones, deceased.
B.

Disposition of the Case Below.

On July 19, 1985, Petitioner/Respondent Linda M.
Cameron filed a Petitioner for Formal Probate of Will and
Appointment of Personal Representative, alleging that her
father, Herbert Lee Jones, had died on July 5, 1985.
Accompanying the Petition for Formal Probate of Will and
Appointment of Personal Representative was a document dated May
1, 1985, which was alleged to be the decedent's will and which
Linda Cameron sought to have probated.

(R. 5-7.).

On August

6, 1985, Petitioner/Appellant Robert Lee Jones filed an
Objection to Petition for Formal Probate and Formal Appointment
of Personal Representative; and Counter Petition for Formal
Appointment of Special Administrator, (R. 9-14.), which he
amended on February 3, 1986.

(R. 40-45.)

The matter was

referred to the trial division of the district court from the
probate division and a trial to the court was held on February
10, 1986, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding.
Following the trial, the court issued a minute entry dated
February 19, 1986.

(R. 93-94).

The court subsequently entered

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law finding the
issues in favor of Linda Cameron.

(R. 110-113.)

On April 15,

1986, the court entered the Formal Probate of Will and

Appointment of Personal Representative from which Robert Lee
Jones has appealed.
C.

(R. 114-15.)

Statement of Facts,

This is a will contest between the two surviving heirs
of Herbert Lee Jones who died on July 5, 1985, at the age of 71
years, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

For approximately

two months prior to his death, he had resided in Salt Lake
- County with his daughter, Respondent Linda M. Cameron.

Prior

to moving to Utah in May, 1985, he had resided during his
entire life in the State of California.

He was divorced and

the father of two children, Appellant Robert Lee Jones and
Respondent Linda M. Cameron.
The present case focuses on a document signed by
Herbert Jones on May 1, 1985, in La Puente Valley Hospital,
West Covina, California.

Herbert Jones had been admitted to

the hospital for surgery.

He had been diagnosed as having

cancer of the colon and was scheduled for a peritoneal
resection and a colostomy.

(Tr. 34.) After learning that her

father was in the hospital, Mrs. Cameron travelled from Utah to
California, arriving on April 30, 1985. Herbert Jones was
greatly relieved to see his daughter and requested that she
take care of all of his affairs, including his salvage grease
business.

She spent the night going through his papers and

books, sorting out his bills and papers.
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The next day, May 1,

1985, she visited him again in the hospital and informed him
that she wanted him to sign a document giving her a power of
attorney so that she could put her name on his checking
account, pay his bills, and take care of his business and other
affairs.

He assented, and she prepared a document, in her own

handwriting, which stated:
I, HERBERT LEE JONES, grant power of ATTORNEY to
my daughter; LINDA M. CAMERON.
(Tr. 10-13.) The document was admitted as Exhibit 1.
At the trial, Mrs. Cameron testified also that she
told her father that he needed a will, to which he also
agreed.

She testified that, thereupon, she changed the period

at the end of the sentence quoted above to a comma and added
the following language:

"AND TO BE EXECUTER [sic] AND SOLE

BENEFICIARY TO MY ESTATE."

(Tr. 20.) Mrs. Cameron claims that

her father signed the document in its completed form on May 1,
1985.

The document was filed with the court to be probated as

Herbert Jones' will.

(R. 6.)

During his discussion with Linda Cameron on May 1,
1985, in the hospital, Herbert Jones gave her directions for
the handling of his personal and business affairs.

(Tr. 9-11,

13, 37-39.) He also gave her directions regarding the
distribution of items of personal property which he wanted
others to have.

(Tr. 49-51.) At the trial, Linda Cameron
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testified that she distributed those items according to her
father's request, including a guitar, which was given to Volita
Jones.

(Tr. 50-51.)
After receiving the signed power of attorney, Linda

Cameron undertook to manage and control all of her father's
affairs.

She put her name on his checking accounty, signed

checks (writing her own name), paid his bills, and had his
mailing address changed to her own address so that she would
receive all of his mail.

(Tr. 11, 13, 37-46.)

She organized

all of his papers and documents and made arrangements for his
business to be taken care of.

(Tr. 11, 44.) Mrs. Cameron

reviewed all of the medical forms that he was required to sign
in connection with the surgery, including one that was
approximately one-quarter of an inch thick.

She did so, as she

testified, because she did not want to make a mistake.

(Tr.

58.)
Linda Cameron subsequently engaged a real estate agent
and listed her father's home in California for sale.

She

reviewed all of the necessary forms and showed her father where
to sign, which he did.
judgment in the matter.
she put in front of him.

(Tr. 64, 66-67.) He trusted her
She testified that he signed whatever
(Tr. 59.)

Mrs. Cameron testified that her father reposed great
trust and confidence in her.

She had graduated from high

school, and had attended several colleges.
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She was also an

instructor at the University of Utah.

(Tr. 39-40.) Her

father, on the other hand, had only received one and one-half
years of formal education.

(Tr. 39.) He had been employed

throughout his adult life as a salvage grease buyer.

It was

his job to pick up used grease from restaurants and to
transport it to a factory to be used in making soap.

(Tr.

10-11.) Mrs. Cameron testified that "he always trusted me with
- everything."
educated.

(Tr. 59.)

f

He counted on me because I am

And he looked up to me for what I do. He trusted me

with his whole life basically."

(Tr. 60.) According to

Herbert's brother, Spencer Jones, Herbert "depended on her for
lots of things," "and was proud of her accomplishments."
"seemed to be the only one he did trust."

She

(Tr. 111.)

On May 2, 1985, Linda Cameron met her brother Robert
Jones at their father's home in California.

Both testified at

the trial that, during the course of the conversation, Linda
Cameron told Robert Jones that their father, Herbert Jones, did
not have a Will.

(Tr. 69-70, 178-79.) Mrs. Cameron claimed at

the trial that she lied to her brother when she made the
statement.

(Tr. 70.)

There was substantial evidence adduced at the trial
that Herbert Lee Jones was extremely anxious and apprehensive
about being in the hospital and having an operation.

According

to Linda Cameron, he was "really scared about having an
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operation."
testified.

(Tr. 25, 56, 60.) Other witnesses similarly
(Tr. 112, 166-67, 173.) According to Mrs. Cameron,

on May 1, 1985, when he signed the document in question, nobody
knew how the operation would turn out, (Tr. 60-61), and he
appeared obviously apprehensive to all who visited him in the
hospital.

Robert Jones testified that, based on his experience

with his father, he belived his father had always had "a lot of
mental problems," "a lot of anxiety, and a lot of paranoia."
(Tr. 184.)

In addition to having cancer, Herbert Jones was

also blind in one eye and had either glaucoma or a cataract in
the other and had trouble with his vision.

(Tr. 59-172.)

There was a conflict in the testimony about whether
the second part of the purported will (Exhibit 1), which made
Linda Cameron the executor and sole beneficiary of her father's
estate, was added to the document before it was signed by
Herbert: Jones. Mrs. Cameron testified that when she wrote the
first part of the document, giving her the power of attorney,
the pen skipped and that she used a different black pen to
write the second part.

(Tr. 21, 47.) Two witnesses at the

trial testified, however, that the second part of the document
had originally been written in blue or blue/black ink.

George

Throckmorton, a forensic document examiner, testified as an
expert witness that he had examined the document under infrared
light using a microscope and that it was his opinion that the
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second part of the document had been originally written in
blue/black ink and then subsequently written over in black
ink.

(Tr. 146-48.)

Similarly, Christopher Andrew testified

that he had examined the purported will on two occasions after
it had been filed for probate with the court, once in the fall
of 1985, and the second time the week before the trial. He
testified that the first time he saw the document he observed
that the second part was written in blue/black ink.

When he

examined the document the week before the trial, however, he
noticed that it had been overwritten in black ink, with the
exception of the comma which was still in blue ink.

(Tr.

129-30.)
Mr. Throckmorton testified also that, based upon his
comparison of the hand writing on the first part of the
document with the hand writing on the second part, it was his
opinion that the two parts were written by different people and
that there was so much the dissimilarity between the two hand
writing styles that the same person could not have written both
parts within the space of an hour, as claimed by Linda
Cameron.

(Tr. 138-46.)
Following the trial to the court, the court generally

found the issues in favor of Linda Cameron and entered Amended
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

(R. 110-12.) The

court found that there was no confidential relationship between
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Linda Cameron and her father and that the purported will
(Exhibit 1) had been completed in its entirety before it was
signed by her father and the witnesses.

The trial court also

found that the will was not procured by the undue influence of
any person.

The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law were entered over the objections of Robert Jones.
97-101.)

(R.

Following the entry of this order, Robert Jones filed

-his Notice of Appeal on April 28, 1986.

(R. 119.)

The court

entered the Formal Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal
Representative on April 15, 1986.

(R. 114-15.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

A confidential relationship existed between Linda

Cameron and her father, Herbert Lee Jones. The existence of a
confidential relationship should be presumed because she was
the daughter of the decedent.

Moreover, the facts demonstrated

a close relationship of trust and confidence between Mrs.
Cameron and her father.

On May 1, 1985, the day on which the

document in question was signed, he had placed into her hands
all of his personal and business affairs. He trusted her in
everything, according to her testimony.

She reviewed all

documents before he signed them and he signed whatever she put
in front of him.

Because of the existence of a confidential

relationship, the lower court committed error in not presuming
that the purported will was procured through her undue
influence.
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2.

The lower court also committed error in not

presuming that Linda Cameron procured the purported will
through undue influence on the grounds that she prepared the
document.

She not only prepared the document, but according to

her testimony, she suggested to her father that he needed a
will.

She wrote it using her own language knowing that her

father did not understand what she was doing but would sign
whatever she put in front of him.
3.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-308 provides that appeals

in cases such as this are to be considered as cases in equity.
This court has a duty to weigh facts, to determine whether the
evidence preponderated against the findings of the lower
court.

In this case, the evidence did preponderate against th<

findings of the lower court that there was no confidential
relationship, that there was no undue influence, and that the
purported will was not altered after it was signed by Herbert
Lee Jones.
4.

The evidence at the lower court was not

sufficient to rebutt the presumption of undue influence.

The

evidence demonstrated overwhelmingly, according to the
testimony of Linda Cameron and other witnesses, that Herbert
Jones placed all of his trust and confidence in her. He
allowed her to take control of all of his personal and business
affairs.

She obtained his power of attorney, put her name on
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his banking account, wrote checks from the account, changed his
mailing address to her own address so that she would receive
his mail, and made arrangements for his business to be taken
care of while he was in the hospital.

She arranged for his

house to be listed and sold and had him sign a real estate
listing; agreement.

She also reviewed medical forms and showed

him where to sign.

Herbert Jones was in the hospital to have

an operation for cancer and was very worried and anxious about
hte procedure.

The testimony was uncontroverted that he had a

great fear of hospitals and doctors.

There was additional

evidence that he had mental problems and suffered from paranoia
which caused him to rely completely on his children in such
times.

Linda Cameron took advantage of him at a time when he

was most susceptible to her influence.
5.

Even if this court affirms the finding that the

document dated May 1, 1985, was the last will of Herbert Jones,
Robert Jones is entitled to inherit his intestate share of the
Estate as a pretermitted heir under Utah Code Ann. 75-2-302.
That statute requires a presumption that an heir was
unintentionally omitted unless it appears from the will that
the omission was intentional.

The document in question

contains no such language on its face.

The lower court

committed error in considering extrinsic evidence regarding the
intent of Herbert Lee Jones.
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6.

The lower court also committed error in finding

that the purported will was not altered after it was signed by
Herbert Lee Jones.

The evidence adduced below preponderates

against this finding•

The evidence demonstrated that the

second part of the document was originally written in
blue/black ink by a different person than the person who wrote
the first part.

At a time Herbert Lee Jones signed the

document, it contained nothing more than a provision giving
Linda Cameron his power of attorney.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING
TO HOLD THAT THERE WAS A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN LINDA CAMERON AND HER FATHER, HERBERT LEE
JONES, GIVING RISE TO A PRESUMPTION THAT THE PURPORTED
WILL WAS PROCURRED THROUGH HER UNDUE INFLUENCE.
Robert Jones objected to the probate of the 1 May 1985
document on the grounds that it was procured by the undue
influence of Linda Cameron.

(R. 41.)

This Court described the

elements of undue influence in the case of In re BryanTs
Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P.2d 602 (1933):
Undue influence may be established without
showing any physical coercion or constraint. The
influence that vitiates may be subtle and be
entirely without outward demonstration, but in
whatever form it may appear it must,
nevertheless, be made to appear from competent
evidence that the will of the one accused of
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practicing undue influence dominated the will of
the testator--that the testament is in fact and
effect the will of the accused and not that of
the testator.
Id. at 620.

See In re Lavelle's Estate, 122 Utah 253, 248

P.2d 372, 378 (1952) ("undue influence is seldom subject to
direct proof, but, as a general rule, must be established by
inferences and circumstances").
As shown below, this Court has uniformly held that the
existence of a confidential relationship between the
beneficiary of a will and the testator will give rise to a
presumption of undue influence.

The evidence presented at

trial clearly demonstrated the existence of a confidential
relationship between Linda Cameron and her father.

The trial

court committed error as a matter of law in finding that there
was no confidential relationship.
In the case of Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226
(Utah 1983), the Court held that a trust instrument executed
simultaneously with a will, which had been previously declared
invalid by reason of undue influence, was also invalid on the
same grounds.

Regarding the existence of a confidential

relationship between the beneficiary and the trustor, the court
stated:
The doctrine of confidential relations requires
that if a confidential relationship is found to
exist between two parties in a transaction, and
if the superior party (in whom trust has been
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reposed) benefits from the transaction, then
"equity raises a presumption of undue influence
and casts upon that party the burden to show
affirmatively entire fairness on his part and
freedom of the other from undue influence."
Id. at 1233 n.5.

See In re Estate of Swan, 4 Utah 2d 277,

293 P.2d 682, 686, 689, 691-93 (1956) (preparation by attorney
of will under which he was a beneficiary gave rise to
presumption that the will was procured by undue influence by
the attorney, which shifted the burden of proof onto the
confidential advisor to persuade the fact finder by a
preponderance of the evidence that no fraud or undue influence
was exerted and that his actions were fair and took no unfair
advantage of his superior position, which was presumed); In re
Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P.2d at 609-10 (evidence that
the beneficiary of a will was in a confidential relationship
with the testator and was active in the preparation of the will
gives rise to a presumption of undue influence).
Although the existence of a confidential relationship
between two persons is generally a question of fact, the law
presumes a parent-child relationship to be confidential.
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978).

In

Blodgett, the Court stated that "[t]here are a few
relationships (such as parent-child, attorney-client, and
trustee-cestui) which the law presumes to be confidential."
Id. at 302. According to the Court, a confidential
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relationship, where not presumed, will otherwise arise ,f[i]f
the circumstances are such that the defendant could exercise
extraordinary influence over the plaintiff and the defendant
was or should have been aware that plaintiff reposed trust and
confidence in the defendant and reasonably relied on
defendant's guidance.ff

Id. at 302. A course of dealing

between persons in a confidential relationship, held the Court,
"is watched with extreme jealousy and solicitude, and if there
is found the slightest trace of undue influence or unfair
advantage, redress will be given to the injured party."

Id.

This principle was followed by the Court, in Johnson
v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959).

There, the

Court rescinded certain deeds given by a father to his son.
The Court held that a confidential relation existed between the
father and the son which gave rise to a presumption that the
transaction was unfair.

Id. at 422. The court stated:

There can be no doubt about the existence of a
confidential relationship here of the very kind
for which the above rule was fashioned. The
evidence shows that his father reposed great
confidence in Calvin [the son]. This is
epitomized by his cooperating with him in making
final arrangements about his property for the
eventuality of death.
Id. at 422.
The evidence in the present case left no doubt about
the existence of a confidential relationship between Linda
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Cameron and her father, Herbert Lee Jones.

The existence of

the confidential relationship between them justified a
presumption of undue influence.

The trial court committed

error in not finding the existence of a confidential
relationship and holding that a presumption of undue influence
had arisen which Linda Cameron had the burden of overcoming.
The court's finding that there was no confidential
relationship and that there was no presumption of undue
influence, entered over the objections of Robert Jones (R.
97-100), was contrary to the evidence of the close relationship
of trust and confidence that existed between Herbert Jones and
his daughter.

Through their numerous communications over the

years, a relationship of trust developed which led Herbert
Jones to give all of his affairs into her hands on May 1, 1985,
as he lay in the hospital preparing for an operation for cancer
of the colon.

Linda Cameron testified that her father "always

trusted me with everything."
educated.

"He counted on me because I am

And he looked up to me for what I do.

with his whole life basically."

He trusted me

(Tr. 59-60.) Herbert Jones,

who had only one and a half years of education, was aware of
his daughter's education, who had attended several colleges and
was an instructor at the University of Utah.

(Tr. 39-40, 60.)

According to the decedent's brother, Spencer Jones, the
decedent "depended on her for lots of things," and was proud of

_ 1 -7_

her accomplishments.
trust/'

She "seemed to be the only one he did

(Tr. 111.)
It was clear from his conduct that Herbert Jones

trusted his daughter on everything and did whatever she
suggested.

He agreed, on her request, to sign a power of

attorney authorizing her to put her name on his checking
account, to pay his bills, to take care of his business.
According to her testimony he also agreed with her statement to
him that he needed a will, which she wrote and had him sign.
He signed whatever she put in front of him, including the power
of attorney, and medical and real estate forms.
66-67).

(Tr. 58, 59,

After arriving in California on April 30, 1985, Linda

Cameron took control of his affairs.

She put her name on his

bank accounty and changed his address to her own so that she
would receive his mail at her home.

She paid his bills and

made arrangements for his business to be taken care of.
acted as his agent and advisor.

She

He did and signed whatever she

told him to do.
Not only was Linda Cameron the daughter of Herbert
Jones, which is sufficient by itself to presume a confidential
relationship, but she was his attorney in fact as well, having
been given his power of attorney.

As the court stated in

Byars v. Stone, 186 Va. 518, 42 S.E.2d 847 (1947):

-18-

An attorney occupies toward his client a high
position of trust and confidence, and in his
relations with his client it is his duty to
exercise and maintain the utmost good faith,
integrity, fairness and fidelity.
• • • •

Similar principles apply to the agency
relationship . . . .
Id. 42 S.E.2d at 852.

See Tatsuno v. Kasai, 70 Utah 203,

259 P. 318, 322 (1927) (Court held that an agent, as a
counselor and advisor, was not entitled to take advantage of
the superior position in which the agency relationship placed
him); 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Agency § 210, at 713 (1986) ("An agent is
a fiduciary with respect to the matters within the scope of his
agency.

The very relationship implies that the principal has

reposed some trust or confidence in the agent, and the agent or
employee is bound to the exercise of the utmost in good faith,
loyalty, and honesty toward his principal or employer").
Appellant Robert Jones urges this court to reverse the
order of the trial court and to remand it with directions that
it find that a confidential relationship existed, thus giving
rise to a presumption of undue influence, the burden of
overcoming which fell upon Linda Cameron.
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II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE PURPORTED WILL WAS PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN
PROCURED THROUGH THE UNDUE INFLUENCE OF
LINDA CAMERON ON THE GROUNDS THAT SHE DRAFTED THE
DOCUMENT AND WAS THE SOLE BENEFICIARY THEREUNDER.
In Finding of Fact No. 4, the trial court found that
the will was drafted by decedent's daughter, Linda Cameron.
(R. 111.)

This by itself was sufficient to give rise to a

presumption of undue influence.

A presumption of undue

influence arises if the one who drafted a will, or was
otherwise active in preparing it or having it executed, also
receives a substantial benefit thereunder.

The general rule is

set forth as follows:
Most of the authorities support the view that a
presumption of undue influence arises upon a
showing that one who drew the will, or was
otherwise active directly in preparing it or
procuring its execution, obtains under the will a
substantial benefit, to which he has a natural
claim, or a benefit which, in amount, is out of
proportion to the amounts received by other
persons having an equal claim to participate in
the bounty of the testator. At least, the
presumption of undue influence is raised where
such circumstances are combined with the
existence of a confidential relation between the
testator and the beneficiary who was thus active
in drawing the will . . . .
Some cases appear to
hold that undue influence is presumed from the
facts that the will was drafted by a beneficiary
favored thereunder and executed by the testator
without obtaining independent legal advice.
79 Am. Jur. 2d Wills § 429 (1975).

See Annot. "Presumption

or Inference of Undue Influence from Testamentary Gift to
Relative, Friend, or Associate of Person Preparing Will or
Procurring Its Execution," 13 A.L.R.3d 385.
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Because of this presumption of undue influence which
arises from the presence of a beneficiary or her participation
in the execution of the will, the courts in sustaining a will,
sometimes refer to the fact that none of the beneficiaries
participated in the preparation or execution of the will.
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sevier, 165 Ky. 158, 176 S.W. 961,
963 (1915); In re Millerfs Estate, 175 Pa. 645, 36 A. 138, 142
(1897).
The fact that Linda Cameron wrote the document which
she claims constituted her father's will is one more reason the
lower court should have presumed that it was procured by undue
influence.

Not only did Linda Cameron write the document, she

wrote it using language that decedent would not understand and
took no effort to explain it to him.

She testified that he had

not used the terms "sole beneficiary" and "estate" in his
discussion with her in his hospital room and she did not
explain the terms to him.

(Tr. 49). She drafted the document

the way she did, as she testified, because it was her
impression that her father was putting the distribution of
everything he owned into her hands.

(Tr. 49-50.)

This is a

case where the purported will was not only drafted by the
decedent's daughter and sole beneficiary, but where she
suggested that he needed a will (Tr. 47) and drafted a document
using language that he did not understand and knowing full well

that he would sign it because of his complete trust in her. As
she testified, he signed whatever she placed in front of him
(Tr. 59) and trusted her "with everything" (Tr. 59), even with
"his whole life."

(Tr. 60.)

Accordingly, this Court should reverse the lower court
for its refusal to hold that the document was presumed to have
been procured through the undue influence of Linda Cameron on
- the grounds that she drafted the document and was the sole
beneficiary thereunder.
III.
THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT AS A CASE IN EQUITY

The Utah Uniform Probate Code, Utah Code Ann. §
75-1-308 (Repl. Vol. 1978), specifies the scope of appellate
review in this case:
Appellate review, including the right to
appellate review, interlocutory appeal,
provisions as to time, manner, notice, appeal
bond, stays, scope of review, record on appeal,
briefs, arguments and power of the appellate
court, is governed by the rules applicable to
the appeals to the Supreme Court in equity cases
from the court of general jusisdiction, except
that in proceedings where jury trial has been had
as a matter of right, the rules applicable to the
scope of review in jury cases apply.
(Emphasis added.)
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This case must accordingly be treated as a case in
equity, under which standard this Court "has a duty, when
called upon, to weigh the facts as well as to review the law."
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150, 151 (Utah 1981).

According to

In the Matter of the Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah
1982), the Supreme Court in an appeal in an equity proceeding,
will "assess the quality and quantity of the evidence to
determine whether it fclearly preponderates against1 the trial
court's finding that the appropriate standard of proof has been
satisfied."

Id. at 1114 n.l.

See Prowitt v. Lunt, 103 Utah

574, 137 P.2d 361 (1943) ("As this is a suit in equity for the
rescission of a contract, it is our duty to make an independent
examination of the record and to review and weigh the evidence
presented by the record.")
Accordingly, Appellant Robert Jones urges this Court
to review certain of the Findings of Fact against which the
evidence clearly preponderated.

Specifically, this Court

should review the following Findings of Fact

(R. Ill):

1.
The rule that the Supreme Court should review
factual issues in equity cases appears to have had its genesis
in Utah Constitution Art. VIII § 9 (Repealed 1984), which
provided that "[i]n equity cases the appeal may be on questions
of both law and fact." Although that provision was repealed
and replaced by the new Article VIII, which became effective
July 1, 1985, the rule continues to have viability as indicated
by Dugan v. Jones, 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Utah 1986) ("In this
proceeding in equity, this Court is free to review both the
facts and the law as found and applied by the trial Court, but
will not disturb the trial Court's findings of facts unless the
evidence clearly preponderates against them.")
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5.

At the time of the drafting of the Will,
there was no confidential relationship
between the decedent and his daughter Linda
Cameron.

6.

The phrase "and to be executer [sic] and
sole beneficiary to my estate" was added to
an unsigned document on May 1, 1985, by the
petitioner Linda Cameron. The phrase was
added to the unsigned document in the
presence of the deceased and executed the
document including the added phrase as his
Will in the presence of the witnesses, and
he and the witnesses executed it in the
presence of each other.

7.

The making of the Will was not procurred by
the undue influence of any person.

8.

The language of the Will without the aid of
extrinsic evidence showed the intent of the
decedent to intentionally omit his son,
2
petitioner Robert Lee Jones from the Will.

As discussed below, the Court's findings are in error
and should be reversed.
IV.
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO
OVERCOME A PRESUMPTION THAT THE PURPORTED WILL WAS
PROCURED BY THE UNDUE INFLUENCE OF LINDA CAMERON.
As argued above, the evidence presented at trial
clearly demonstrated the existence of a confidential

2.
This finding involves a question of law and not
of fact. Whether "[i]t appears from the Will that the omission
[of Robert Jones] was intentional" within the meaning of Utah
Code Ann. § 75-2-302(a) is a question for the Court to decide.
On appeal, this Court should review the lower Court's finding
as it would any conclusion of law.
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relationship between Herbert Jones and his daughter, Linda,
which created a presumption that she acted with undue
influence.

The evidence was also clear that she in fact acted

with undue influence in urging her father to sign the document
that she prepared giving her his power of attorney and making
her the sole beneficiary of his estate.

She took advantage of

his trust and confidence in a situation in which he was
- particularly susceptible to her influence, two days before his
operation for cancer.

As noted above, Herbert Jones trusted

his daughter with everything, even with "his whole life."

(Tr.

60.) According to Herbert's brother, Spencer Jones, Mrs.
Cameron "seemed to be the only one he did trust."

(Tr. 111.)

All of the witnesses who knew Herbert Jones were
unanimous in their opinion that he was very nervous and
apprehensive about being in the hospital and having an
operation.

He had been diagnosed as having cancer and was to

undergo a peritoneal resection and a colostomy.

(Tr. 34.)

According to Linda Cameron he was "really scared about having
an operation."

(Tr. 25.)

See Tr. 56, 60, 112, 166-67, 173.

According to Mrs. Cameron, on May 1, 1985, when he signed the
document in question, nobody knew how the operation would turn
out, (Tr. 60-61), and he appeared obviously apprehensive to all
who visited him in the hospital.
Robert Jones testified that, based on his life-long
experience with his father, he believed his father had always
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had "a lot of mental problems," "a lot of anxiety, and a lot of
paranoia."

(Tr. 184.) Robert Jones had lived with his father

until he went into the Navy at age 18. He lived with his
father for a year after returning from the service and then for
nearly two years in 1979 and 1980. He testified that he saw
his father an average of twice a month when not living with
him, for a period of approximately twenty years.
159-60.)

(Tr.

During all of the experience that Robert Jones had

with his father, he observed peculiarities in his behavior.
Robert testified that his father "couldn't stand being around
other people.

He couldn't stand to be in elevators. He

couldn't stand to be in crowded rooms."

(Tr. 167.) Herbert

refused to go the doctor for eye treatment that could have
restored his vision in one eye.

(Tr. 172-73.)

Robert never

saw his father attend a wedding, funeral, or social function.
(Tr. 167.) Herbert Jones did not attend the funeral of his son
Everett (Tr. 167), and refused to visit Robert when, as a seven
year old boy, he spent nine months in the hospital with polio.
(Tr. 162.) Robert testified that there were periods of time
when his father would become particularly despondent and would
sit in a darkened room for long periods of time.
165.)

(Tr. 163,

It was one such incident in 1979 when Herbert informed

Robert that he believed he was going to die that caused Robert
to move in with his father for approximately two years.
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(Tr.

165.) During that period of time, Herbert Jones relied totally
on his son, Robert, who took him to five different doctors,
including a psychiatrist, in an effort to help him recover.
Robert ran his grease route with him and took care of him for
that period of time.
son.

(Tr. 173.) Herbert relied totally on his

(Tr. 185.)
That propensity to rely on his children in times of

depression and fear was manifested in Herbert's dealings with
Linda Cameron when he was in the hospital on May 1, 1985, two
days before his cancer operation.

He wanted her to take care

of all of his affairs. He was so relieved to see her when she
arrived from Utah, that he "[k]ind of wilted when [she] walked
into the room and [they] sat down next to each other and
cried."

(Tr. 9.)

He told her where he kept his papers, which

she spent the night going through.

(Tr. 10.) From that point

on, everything that Herbert Jones did was at his daughter's
direction.

He placed himself entirely in her hands.

She

testified that he trusted her "with everything," "with his
whole life."

(Tr. 59, 60.)

She described the preparation of

the power of attorney, Exhibit 1, as follows:
Q.

Okay. Now would you please describe the
events of May 1? When you saw your father,
then what happened?

A.

I sacked up a bunch of his papers, his check
book and drove his grease truck down to the
hospital. Walked in and visited with him
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for a while, and I told him all the things
that I had felt I needed to do that day. I
needed to get to the bank and the post
office and generally get his business in
order.
And I said, "I have to go to the bank. In
order to write your checks I need my name on
your checking account." And I wanted him to
sign a Power of Attorney. There was a form
that I had. I wrote it.
(Tr. 11.)

The document giving her power of attorney was

- introduced as Exhibit 1.
After having her father sign the power of attorney
document, she had her name put on his bank account and wrote
checks in the account.

(Tr. 43, 45.)

She made arrangements

for his grease route to be taken care of.

(Tr. 44, 45.)

She

changed his mailing address with the Post Office so that all of
his mail would go to her home.

(Tr. 46.) Mrs. Cameron

testified that she read all of the forms that he needed to sign
in the hospital and had him sign them.

(Tr. 57-58.)

She

testified that he signed whatever she put in front of her
father for him to sign, (Tr. 59.)

In addition to the medical

forms that he signed in the hospital, she had him sign a real
estate listing agreement in California listing his home for
sale.

He signed it, as she testified, because he trusted her

judgment regarding the transaction.

(Tr. 67.)

At the trial, Mrs. Cameron testified that her father
had said something in the hospital to the effect that he did
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not want his son Robert to "have anything."

There was no

testimony about what Herbert Jones meant by this statement or
that he was talking about how he wanted his estate to go when
he died.

Linda Cameron testified that there was absolutely no

discussion in the hospital on May 1, 1985, about the
possibility of his dying or that his cancer would be terminal.
(Tr. 71.)

Even so, Mrs. Cameron claims that when Herbert Jones

stated he did not want his son to have anything, she told him
that he needed a will, to which he agreed.

(Tr. 19-20, 47.)

She testified further that she added the second part of Exhibit
1, which read "AND TO BE EXECUTER [sic] AND SOLE BENEFICIARY TO
MY ESTATE."

(Tr. 20.)

She claims she read it to her father

and that all he said was "good."

(Tr. 20.) The language of

the document was created entirely by Linda Cameron.
dictate it to her or tell her what to write.
effort to explain the document to her father.

He did not

She made no
He did not tell

her that he wanted her to be "sole beneficiary" or the
"executor" of his estate, neither of which terms he used in his
discussion with Linda Cameron in the hospital.

She admitted

that she made no effort to explain the terms to him.

(Tr.

48-49.)
There was evidence at the trial that Herbert Jones did
not intend Linda Cameron to be his sole beneficiary.
testified as follows:

She

And was it your impression then based on
what your father said to you that he was
putting the distribution of everything that
he owned into your hands?
Yes.

He understood that.

He wanted you to take care?
More importantly, it wasn't that I would
have everything. It was so that Bobby
wouldn't get nothing.
Did he want you to take some of his
possessions and give them to other people?
Yeah.
Why do you say that?
Because he told me.
What did he say?
That, well, he talked, one thing that I
recall right now is that Volita said she
wanted to have the guitar at one time. And
then I was, you know, to remember about it.
And he was, you know, going to go through
and get one for her eventually.
And your father knew that you knew what he
wanted to gift [sic] to other people, the
guitars for example?
The things that were important to him he
knew.
So essentially he was leaving up to you the
decision about what to give to other people
and what not to give to them?
Yeah. There wasn't a lot that he had in
mind, but a few things that came into mind.
Okay. But he didn't put that in this Will,
did he?
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A.

That is not in the Will. No.

Q.

The Will just leaves everything to you,
isn't that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Is that your opinion of it?

A.

To do with as he wanted it done.

Q.

And were you going to make sure that Volita
got the guitar or the banjo, whatever it was?

A.

Absolutely.

Q.

Have you done that?

A.

Uh-hum. It wasn't so much as an inheritance
as something he always tried to remember he
was going to do it. She got the guitar
before we ever left.

Q.

You gave it to her even before you left
California?

A.

Uh-hum. I loaded every musical instrument
my father had in the house in the motorhome
because he wanted them with him. In the
process of going through them all I found
the one, and he said, well--

(Tr. 49-51.)
It is clear from this testimony that Herbert Jones did
not intend the document to be his last will and that he did not
understand what the words "sole beneficiary to my estate"
meant.

He simply left it to his daughter to prepare whatever

document she thought he needed to sign, and he signed, not
because he understood what he was doing, but because he was
willing to do or sign whatever she wanted.
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The term "sole

beneficiary" was created by her and used entirely for her own
convenience.

He did not understand what it was he was signing,

having had only one and a half years of formal education.

The

terms "sole beneficiary" and "estate" were her words, not his.
He signed the document because he had placed himself entirely
in her hands. Mrs. Cameron testified that he would sign
whatever she put in front of him to sign.
said:

(Tr. 59.) As she

"He counted on me because I am educated.

up to me for what I do.
basically."

And he looked

He trusted me with his whole life,

(Tr. 60.)

Mrs. Cameron's ability to exercise undue influence was
made easier by her father's ill health and poor physical
condition.

A decedent's weakened physical condition at the

time of the execution of will may be considered in determining
whether he was unduly influenced.
re Bryan's Estate,

As the Court observed in In

82 Utah 390, 25 P.2d 602 (1933), "the

amount of influence necessary to dominate a mind impaired by
age, disease, or dissipation [is] obviously less than that
required to control a strong mind."

25 P.2d 610.

See In re

George's Estate, 100 Utah 230, 112 P.2d 498, 501 (1941) (the
weakened physical condition of a testator is a "fertile field
for undue influence");

In re Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 580, 52

P.2d 1103 (1935); Johnson v. Johnson, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d
420 (1959),

-32-

The evidence was uncontroverted that Herbert Jones was
in the hospital because he had cancer. (Tr. 60.) He was blind
in one eye and had either a cataract or glaucoma in the other.
(Tr. 59, 172.) He was frightened and anxious about the
operation he was to undergo two days later.

She was at his

bedside in the hospital when he was most susceptible to her
influence and took advantage of that opportunity.
As argued above, the trial court committed error in
not presuming that the May 1, 1985, document was procured as a
result of Linda Cameron's undue influence.

Even in the absence

of such a presumption, the court erred in not holding that
Linda Cameron had in fact exercised undue influence over her
father when he was in the hospital.

The evidence given by Mrs.

Cameron herself demonstrated that her will dominated his and
that he did whatever she suggested and signed whatever was put
in front of him.
V.
IF THE DOCUMENT DATED 1 MAY 1985 IS THE VALID WILL
OF THE DECEDENT, ROBERT JONES IS ENTITLED
TO INHERIT AS A PRETERMITTED CHILD.
If this Court upholds the finding of the lower court
that the 1 May 1985 document is the valid will of Herbert
Jones, Robert Jones is entitled to take his intestate share of
the Estate as a pretermitted heir under Utah Code Ann. §
75-2-302 (Repl. Vol. 1978), which provides:
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Pretermitted Children. -- (1) If a testator
fails to provide in his will for any of his
children or issue of a deceased child, the
omitted child or issue receives a share in the
estate equal in value to that which he would have
received if the testator had died intestate
unless:
(a) It appears from the will that the
omission was intentional;
(b) When the will was executed the testator
had one or more children and devised
substantially all his estate to or for the
exclusive benefit of the other parent of the
omitted child, or of the deceased child whose
issue are omitted; or
(c) The testator provided for the child or
issue by transfer outside the will and the intent
that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary
provision is shown by statements of the testator
or from the amount of the transfer or other
evidence. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
If none of the exceptions set forth in subparagraphs
(a) through (c) of the statute are satisfied, the law presumes
that the failure to mention the child in the will was
unintentional.

See In re Estate of Hilton, 98 N.M. 420, 649

P.2d 448, 490-91 (1982) (case construing a pretermitted child
statute similar to Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-302 (Repl. Vol. 1978)).
A.

The language contained in the 1 May 1985
document drafted by Linda M. Cameron does
not demonstrate the intent of the decedent
to disinherit his son, Robert Jones.

Section 75-2-302(1)(a) states that a child omitted
from a will is entitled to inherit as a pretermitted child
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unless

,f

[i]t appears from the will that the omission was

intentional/1

Id,

The presumption created by Section

75-2-302(1)(a) that Herbert Jones unintentionally omitted his
son, can only be rebutted by language of the 1 May 1985
document.

In order to prove from the language of the 1 May

1985 document that the omission of Robert Jones was
intentional, the document must, at a minimum, either mention
Robert Jones by name or fairly and clearly express an intention
on the part of Herbert Jones to exclude his son as part of a
group or a class.
In Smith v. Crook, 160 Cal. App. 3d 245, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 524 (1984), the court reversed the decision of the trial
court and held that the statutory presumption against
disinheritance stood unrebutted.

The court stated:

"In order

for a testator to disinherit his lineal descendants, the intent
to do so must be unmistakably expressed; it must appear on the
face of the will that, at the time of its execution, the
testator knowledgeably and intentionally omitted to provide for
his descendants."

Id. at 526.

See In re Estate of Hilton,

98 N.M. 420, 649 P.2d 488, 495 (1982) ("language of a will . .
. must either mention the claimant by name or fairly and
clearly express an intention on the part of the testator to
exclude claimant as a group or class"); Crumpfs Estate v.
Freeman, 614 P.2d 1096, 1099 (Okl. 1980) (in affirming the
decision of the lower court that granddaughter was a
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pretermitted heir because there was no mention of her by name
or class the court held that [b]efore 'natural rights and
expectation1 of one's issue to share in the ancestor's wealth
may be legally extinguished, the intent to disinherit must
appear upon the face of the will in strong and convincing
language"); Estate of Hirschi, 113 Cal. App. 3d 681, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 186, 188 (1980) (in affirming the decision of the lower
court that petitioner was not a pretermitted heir of the
deceased, the court stated that an heir may be disinherited if
he belongs to a class of persons expressly excluded from the
will of the testator); In re McClure's Estate, 214 Cal. App.
2d 590, 29 Cal. Rptr. 569, 571 (1963) (affirming the lower
court decision that the testamentary provision effectively
expressed the intention of the testatrix to disinherit her
granddaughter the court held that M[t]o establish an intent to
disinherit a person claiming to be a pretermitted heir, it must
appear on the face of the will that, at the time of its making,
the testator had that person in mind and intentionally omitted
\:o provide for him").
The 1 May 1985 document states in its entirety:
I, HERBERT LEE JONES grant power of ATTORNEY to
my daughter, LINDA M. CAMERON, AND TO BE EXECUTER
[sic] AND SOLE BENEFICIARY TO MY ESTATE.
The language of the document does not show that the omission of
Robert Jones was intentional.

No language mentions Robert
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Jones by name or fairly and clearly expresses the intention of
his father to exclude him as a part of a group or a class. It
does not appear on the face of the 1 May 1985 document that at
the time of its execution, Herbert Jones knowledgeably and
intentionally omitted to provide for his son.

No strong and

convincing language manifesting an intent to disinherit appears
upon the face of the 1 May 1985 document.

There is no language

in the 1 May 1985 document showing that Herbert Jones had his
son, Robert Jones, in mind and intentionally omitted to provide
for him.
The term "sole beneficiary" used in the document,
without mention of Robert Jones by name or as part of a
disinherited group or class, is insufficient to prove that the
omission was intentional.

The testatorial disposition of an

entire estate does not alone affirmatively evidence an intent
to omit a child.

See Crumpfs Estate v. Freeman, 614 P.2d

1096, 1099 (Okl. 1980) (children of deceased were pretermitted
even though the will of the decedent disposed of his entire
estate).
Accordingly, the presumption of section 75-2-302 is
unrebutted and entitles Appellant Robert Jones as a
pretermitted child to share in the estate of his father in
accordance with the laws of intestate succession.
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B

-

Under Section 75-2-302(1)(a), extrinsic
evidence is not admissible to overcome the
presumption against disinheritance because
the intention to disinherit must appear in
the language of the will itself.

In its Findings of Fact, the trial court stated ,f[t]he
language of the will without the aid of extrinsic evidence
showed the intent of the decedent to intentionally omit his
son, petitioner Robert Lee Jones from the will."

(R. 111.) In

addition to the language of the will itself, the court also
admitted and considered extrinsic evidence concerning Herbert
Jones' intent.

This evidence was admitted over the objections

of Robert Jones.

(Tr. 14-17, 82, 106-07).

Finding of Fact No. 9, which states:

The court entered

"had the court considered

the extrinsic evidence it heard, that consideration would have
reinforced the showing of intent by the decedent to omit his
son, petitioner Robert Lee Jones, from the will."

(R. 112.)

The trial court, although requested to do so, (R. 98), failed
to specify what language of the will it was referring to that
showed the intent of the decedent to intentionally omit his son.
The language of Section 75-2-302(1)(a) is clear that
an intent to disinherit must "appear from the will."

See In

re Estate of Hilton, 98 N.M. 420, 649 P.2d 488 (App. 1982).
In Hilton, the court of Appeals of New Mexico interpreted the
New Mexico pretermitted child statute.

The New Mexico Statute

is identical to the pretermitted child statute in Utah,
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providing that an omitted child takes his intestate share
unless "[i]t appears from the will that the omission was
intentional."

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-302 (1978).

The New

Mexico court held that, under the pretermitted child statute,
extrinsic evidence is not admissible to overcome the
presumption against disinheritance.

The intent to disinherit,

held the court, must appear in the language of the will
itself.

649 P.2d at 491.

See In re Estate of Crump, 614

P.2d 1096, 1097 (Okl. 1980) (in affirming the decision of the
lower court that the granddaughter of the testator was
pretermitted, the court stated that an intentional omission
3
must appear from the four corners of the will).
Because the 1 May 1985 document contains no language
showing that Herbert Jones had his son in mind and
intentionally omitted to provide for him, it is apparent that

3.
Linda Cameron may attempt, as she did in the lower
court, to rely on the 1931 decision in In re Newell1s Estate,
7 Utah 463, 5 P.2d 230 (1931), in which the Supreme Court of
Utah held that extrinsic evidence was admissible to show an
intent to disinherit. The statute construed in that case,
however, was significantly different from Section 75-2-302 in
that it allowed a pretermitted child to take his or her
intestate share of the estate "unless it appears that such
omission was intentional." Compiled Laws of Utah § 6341
(1917). Thus, the statute in force at the time of the decision
allowed the admission of extrinsic evidence. That statute has
since been superseded by Section 75-2-302 which specifically
states that it must "appear from the will that the omission was
intentional."

-39-

the trial court relied on some type of extrinsic evidence in
making its finding that the language of the document showed the
intent of the decedent to intentionally omit his son. The
consideration of the extrinsic evidence constituted reversible
error.

Because construction of the written document without

consideration of extrinsic evidence is a question of law,, this
Court should reverse the lower court ruling and should hold
- that the will does not contain necessary language evidencing an
intent to disinherit under Section 75-2-302(1)(a).
C.

The testator did not devise substantially
all his estate to or for the exclusive
benefit of the mother of the Petitioner
Robert Jones and did not provide for his
son by other transfer.

The exceptions to the presumption against
disinheritance contained in section 75-2-302(1)(b) and (l)(c)
are not: applicable to the present case.

There was no evidence

that the decedent devised substantially all his estate to or
for the exclusive benefit of the other parent of Robert Jones
nor was there evidence that the decedent provided for his son
outside the 1 May 1985 document.
VI.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
EXHIBIT 1 WAS SIGNED AS A WILL AND THAT
IT WAS NOT ALTERED AFTER MAY 1, 1985.
The lower Court found that the purported will was
executed by Herbert Jones in its completed form on May 1,
1985.

(R. 111.) Linda Cameron testified that she added the
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language, "AND TO BE EXECUTER [sic] AND SOLE BENEFICIARY TO MY
ESTATE" after her father agreed with her direction that he
needed a will.

She stated that she wrote the first part of the

document, giving her power of attorney, with a black Papermate
pen, (Tr. 21), and the second part, making her executor and
sole beneficiary, with a black Cross pen.

(Tr. 47.)

She could

not recall which pen was used by the witnesses and Herbert
Jones.

(Tr. 47-48.)

She made the change, she stated, because

the first pen was having trouble writing.

(Tr. 21.).

Linda Cameron's testimony on this point was
contradicted by significant evidence, including evidence
apparent on the face of the document which shows clearly that
the second part was originally written in blue/black ink and
subsequently overwritten in black ink.

At the trial, Robert

Jones called Mr. George Throckmorton as an expert witness in
the area of forensic document examination.

He testified that

he had examined the original May 1, 1986, document and that it
was his opinion that the first part of the document was written
by a different person than the one who wrote the second part
which designated Linda Cameron as executor and sole
beneficiary.

(Tr. 138.) His opinion was based on the

difference between the handwriting of the first part and second
parts.

The inconsistencies between the two parts "fell outside

of the realm of natural variation," (Tr. 140.) and could not
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have been written by the same person within the space of an
hour.

(Tr. 146.)*

In

arriving at his opinions, Mr.

Throckmorton testified that he compared certain letters in the
first part with the same letter, in the second part, such as
the letters "A," "N," "M," and "Y."

(Tr. 140-46.) He

testified, in addition, that there were nine other letters in
which he noticed differences.

(Tr. 155-56.) Moreover, the

second part was written entirely in capital letters, in
contrast to the first part.

(Tr. 142.)

Mr. Throckmorton testified that he had examined the
document under a microscope and that the second part was
originally written in blue/black ink which was overwritten or
traced with a black ballpoint pen.

(Tr. 139, 146-47.) The

comma separating the two parts was originally written in black,
but was thereafter made into a comma with blue ink, without any
overwriting in black.

(Tr. 147.)

In Mr. Throckmorton's

opinion it would have taken approximately two minutes for
someone to have overwritten the second part in black ink.

(Tr.

149.)
In addition to the testimony of Mr. Throckmorton
regarding his examination of the document, Christopher Andrew
testified that, as a courier employed by Robert Jones' legal
counsel, he was requested on two separate occasions to travel
to the clerk's office and to the document.
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The first time he

examined the document, in the fall of 1985, he noticed that
"the second half of the document seemed to be written in a
blue/black ink, whereas the first half of the document was just
a plain black ink."

(Tr. 129.) The second time he looked at

the document in the clerk1s office was a week and a half before
the trial, which occurred on February 10, 1986.

On that

occasion, he observed that "someone had written over the second
- part with a black ink."

(Tr. 129-30.)

That overwriting had to

have occurred after the document was filed for probate.
Based upon the testimony of Mr. Throckmorton and Mr.
Andrews, it is clear that the second part of the document,
which purports to make Linda Cameron the executor and sole
beneficiary of her father's estate, was not written with a
black pen as she testified (Tr. 47.) but with a blue or
blue/black pen.

Moreover, the second part was not written by

the same person who wrote the first part since, as Mr.
Throckmorton testified, the natural variation in a person's
handwriting would not allow for the inconsistencies and
differences in handwriting between the first and the second
parts of the document.

The two parts could not have been

written within the space of an hour by the same person.

(Tr.

146.)
This evidence can only lead to the conclusion that the
second part of the document was added later on, after it had
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been signed by Herbert Lee Jones and the witnesses.

After the

document was filed for probate, someone checked it out of the
clerk's office and wrote over the second part in black ink in
an effort to make it look as if the entire document were
written in black ink with the same pen.

The document that

Herbert Jones signed on May 1, 1985, was not a will, but was a
power of attorney.

Both Linda Cameron and Robert Jones

testified that they had a conversation at their father's home
on May 2, 1985, in which Mrs. Cameron told her brother Robert
their father had no will.

(Tr. 69-70, 178-79.) Although Mrs.

Cameron now claims that she lied to her brother, her statement
that there was no will fits with all the other evidence
suggesting that the document was not signed as a will but that
the second part was added later, presumably after Herbert's
death.
Because the evidence at trial clearly preponderated
against the court's finding that the purported will was
executed by Herbert Lee Jones as a will, this Court should
exercise its equitable powers and reverse the trial court's
decision.

As argued above in Point III, because this is a case

in equity the Court has the duty to review the facts of the
case and to reverse when it appears that the evidence
preponderated against the court's findings.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court committed error in not finding the
existence of a confidential relationship between Linda Cameron
and her father.

Because of the great trust and confidence that

existed between them as father and child, and because he placed
all of his affairs in her hands, a confidential relationship
should have been found.

Moreover, she acted as his agent and

attorney in fact, having been given his power of attorney.
The court further committed error in refusing to
presume that the purported will was procured by the undue
influence of Linda Cameron.

The lower court was required to

hold that such a presumption existed not only because of the
confidential relationship that existed between Linda Cameron
and Herbert Jones but because she prepared the document and was
the sole beneficiary thereunder.

The evidence was insufficient

to rebut the presumption against her that there was undue
influence.

Linda Cameron testified regarding the great trust

and confidence her father had in her.

She testified that he

trusted her with everything, even his own life, and that he
signed whatever she put in front of him to sign.
The lower court also committed error in refusing to
find that Robert Lee Jones was a pretermitted heir under the
Utah pretermitted heir statute.

The extrinsic evidence

introduced at the trial should not have been admitted to show

Herbert Lee Jones' intent to disinherit his son Robert.
According to the statute, the court must look to the face of
the will itself to determine an intent to disinherit.

The

document in question does not evidence any such intent on the
part of Herbert Jones to disinherit his son Robert by
identifying him or the class to which he belonged.
Finally, the lower court erred in holding that the
purported will was signed in its completed form by Herbert Lee
Jones and that it was witnessed in that form and that it was
not altered subsequently.

The evidence adduced below

preponderated against the court's finding and, as a case in
equity, should be reversed by this court.

The evidence showed

that the second part of the document was written in blue ink,
and not: in black as testified by Linda Cameron.

The expert

witness called by Robert Jones testified at trial that the
second part of the document was not written by the same person
who wrote the first part and that the inconsistencies and
differences in the handwriting between the two parts could not
be explained by natural variation typically present in a
person's handwriting.
Accordingly, Appellant Robert Lee Jones urges this
Court to reverse the lower court and to remand it with
instructions not to admit the document dated May 1, 1985, to
probate as Herbert Lee Jones' last Will.

-46-

In the alternative,

if this Court affirms the lower courtfs ruling that the
document was in fact his last will, Robert Jones urges the
court to hold that he is a pretermitted heir within the meaning
of the Utah statute and that he is entitled to his intestate
share of the Estate.
ADDENDUM
Petitioner/Appellant Robert Lee Jones has appended
hereto copies of the following documents:
1.
Jones.

(Exhibit 1.)
2.

1986.

Document dated May 1, 1985, signed by Herbert Lee

Lower Court's minute entry dated February 19,

(R. 93-94.)
3.

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

(R. 110-13.)
4.

Formal Probate of Will and Appointment of

Personal Representative.
DATED this V

(R. 114-15.)
day of October, 1986.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
R. Stephen Marshall
Thomas E. Nelson

V^\^M^

By

Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
Robert Lee Jones
50 South Main, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct
copies of the within and foregoing Brief to be hand delivered
this If*

day of October, 1986, to the following:
Alan M. Williams
Thompson & Williams
9662 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
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Alan M. Williams (3478)
Attorneys for Petitioner Linda Cameron
9662 South State Street
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Telephone: 562-2555

HLED IN CLERK'S OFFICL
Salt Lake County Utah
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Duty Ctert

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
HERBERT LEE JONES,
Deceased.

/^TH&vbeb.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Probate No. P85-0736
Judge Homer Wilkinson

The above entitled matter came on regularly to be heard
before the Honorable Homer Wilkinson, one of the Judges of the
above-entitled Court, on the 10th day of February, 1986 at the
hour of 9:00 o'clock A.M..

Petitioner Linda Cameron appeared

personally and by her attorney, Alan M. Williams.

Petitioner

Robert Lee Jones appeared personally and by his attorneys, R.
Steven Marshall and Thomas E. Nelson.

Witness were sworn and

testified; and the issues raised by the objection to Petitioner
Linda Cameron's petition were argued by counsel orally and upon
trial briefs.

The Court does hereby make the following findings

of fact and conclusions of law based on the hearing and the
pleadings:

0
^ttO^

fF

'< t
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The testamentary instrument to which the petition

relates is the decedent's last will.
2.

It was executed on May 1, 1985 by

Herbert Lee Jones ,

the decedent, in West Covina, California.
3*

At the time of the execution, the decedent had the

testamentary capacity to make a will.
A.

The will was drafted by the decedent's daughter, Linda

Cameron.
5.

At the time of the drafting of the will, there was no

confidential relationship between the decedent and his daughter
Linda Cameron.
6.

The phrase "and to be executer and sole beneficiary to

my estate" was added to an unsigned document on May 1, 1985 by
the petitioner Linda Cameron.

That phrase was added to the

unsigned document in the presence of the deceased and witnesses.
The deceased acknowledged and executed the document including
the added phrase as his will in the presence of the witnesses,
and he and the witnesses executed it in the presence of each
other*
7.

The making of the will was not procured by the undue

influence of any person.
8.

The language of the will without the aid of extrinsic

evidence showed the intent of the decedent to intentionally omit
his son, petitioner Robert Lee Jones from the will.

t?

u
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9.

Had the court considered the extrinsic evidence it

leard, that consideration would have reinforced the showing of
intent by the decedent to omit his son, petitioner Robert Lee
Jones from the will*
10.

The court finds the other issues made by the pleadings

in favor of petitioner Linda Cameron and against the petitioner
Robert Lee Jones.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The will of the decedent, Herbert Lee Jones was

properly executed and acknowledged by the decedent and the
witnesses in each otherfs presence.
2.

The petitioner Robert Lee Jones should take no part of

the estate by virtue of the provisions of Section 75-2-302(1),
Utah Code Annotated.
-3.

The will was not procured by undue influence on the

part of petitioner Linda Cameron.
A.

The objection of the petitioner Robert Lee Jones should

be denied.
5.

The May 1, 1985 will executed by the decedent should be

admitted to probate

DATED this

/<•*

day of

, ATTEST
H.DIXON HINDLEY
~
^AERK

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certifiy that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law was mailed to
R. Steven Marshall and Thomas E. Nelson, attorneys for
petitioner Robert Lee Jones, VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL, AND
MCCARTHY, P.O. Box 45340, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-45340, on

this f5**~ day of A p K I

1986
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FILED IN CLERK oOFHCE
Salt Lake County, Utan

THOMPSON & WILLIAMS
W. Paul Thompson ( 3 2 4 4 )
/ A l a n M. W i l l i a m s ( 3 4 7 8 )
A t t o r n e y s f o r P e t i t i o n e r Linda Cameron
9662 South S t a t e S t r e e t
Sandy, Utah 84070
Telephone: 562-2555
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
HERBERT LEE JONES,
Deceased.

FORMAL PROBATE OF
WILL AND APPOINTMENT
OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
Probate No. P85-0736
Judge Homer Wilkinson

The above entitled matter came on regularly to be heard
before the Honorable Homer Wilkinson, on of the Judges of the
above-entitled Court, on the 10th day of February, 1986 at the
hour of 9:00 o'clock A.M..

Petitioner Linda Cameron appeared

personally and by her attorney, Alan M. Williams.

Petitioner

Robert Lee Jones appeared personally and by his attorneys, R.
Steven Marshall and Thomas E. Nelson.

Witness were sworn and

testified; and the issues raised by the objection to Petitioner
Linda Cameron f s petition were argued by counsel orally and upon
trial briefs.

The Court having made its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, does hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE, and DECREE as
follows:
1.

\
The will of the decedent, dated May 1, 1985, is hereby

formally probated.

0,00*'

c

^
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The objection of the petitioner Robert Lee Jones is

denied.
3.

Linda Cameron is hereby formally appointed as the

personal representative of the decedent, to act without bond.
4.

Upon qualification and acceptance, letters testamentary

shall be issued to the said personal representative.

.V'*

'.V'n

•i

Dated this (^^

day of

Ajull _L

, 1986.

BY THE COURT:

/
;

. H.DIXONHINDLEY
;: v..
CLERK

Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
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I hereby certifiy that a true and correct copy of the

Deputy Clerl

foregoing Formal Probate and Appointment of Personal
Representative was mailed to R. Steven Marshall and Thomas E.
Nelson, VAN COTT, BAVGLEY,. CORNWALL, AND MCCARTHY, P.O. Box
45340, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-45340, on this ~?H
Hjui^y

day of

» 1986
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